A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit heard oral argument yesterday in Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, the cases brought by the recording industry against Boston University grad student Joel Tenenbaum. Tenebaum is appealing the judgment against him for downloading 30 songs.
Concluding that the jury's damage award of $675,000 was so "unprecedented and oppressive" that it could not withstand scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the U. S. Constitution, the trial judge, District Judge Nancy Gertner, had reduced the award to $67,500, an amount she described as still "severe, even harsh."
On appeal, Tenenbaum argues, among other things, that the award remains unconstitutionally excessive and that the Digital Theft Deterrence Act of 1999, which provided the basis for an increased range of statutory damages for copyright infringement (see 17 U.S.C. Sec. 504(c)), was not intended to apply to individual, non-commercial consumers.
The music companies appeal Judge Gertner's reduction of the award.
You can listen to an audio recording of the oral arguments here.
Tenenbaum is represented by a team of lawyers and law students led by Harvard Law School professor Charles Nesson, and on Monday HLS 3L Jason Harrow argued on behalf of Tenenbaum. A Web site, Joel Fights Back, is dedicated to the cause.
This is only the second case to go to trial against an individual accused of unlawful music dowloading/sharing.
In 2008 the music industry decided to no longer pursue individuals for allegedly unlawful music downloading or sharing (as reported in this Wall Street Journal article), but that it would continue with suits already in progress.
Showing posts with label First Circuit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label First Circuit. Show all posts
April 5, 2011
October 13, 2009
Staples Nails Verdict
The National Law Journal reports that last week a jury sitting in the Noonan v. Staples case in federal court in Boston found that when Staples sent a mass email about a former employee's violation of company travel and expense policies it did not do so with actual malice.
Earlier this year the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a dismissal of the case against Staples, holding that the plaintiff could seek to establish a libel claim based on the publication of truthful facts if they were published with "actual malevolent intent or ill will." In so doing, the Court relied on an old Massachusetts law, G. L. c. 231, sec. 92, which provides that truth is a justification for a publication alleged to be libellous, unless it was published with actual malice.
The jury in the Staples case evidently found that there was no such "actual malice" on the part of Staples.
It is important to note that the use of the term "actual malice" in the 1902 Massachusetts statute long-predates, and should not be confused with, the the term "actual malice" used by the Supreme Court of the United States in the seminal 1963 case of New York Times v. Sullivan. In that case, the Court laid out constitutional standards to protect the press from defamation claims brought by public officials. holding that a public official could not recover for libel unless the plaintiff could show that the defamatory statement was made with "actual malice," which the Court defined as making the defamatory statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.
The Noonan case, of course, involved a private plaintiff and defendant.
Earlier this year the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a dismissal of the case against Staples, holding that the plaintiff could seek to establish a libel claim based on the publication of truthful facts if they were published with "actual malevolent intent or ill will." In so doing, the Court relied on an old Massachusetts law, G. L. c. 231, sec. 92, which provides that truth is a justification for a publication alleged to be libellous, unless it was published with actual malice.
The jury in the Staples case evidently found that there was no such "actual malice" on the part of Staples.
It is important to note that the use of the term "actual malice" in the 1902 Massachusetts statute long-predates, and should not be confused with, the the term "actual malice" used by the Supreme Court of the United States in the seminal 1963 case of New York Times v. Sullivan. In that case, the Court laid out constitutional standards to protect the press from defamation claims brought by public officials. holding that a public official could not recover for libel unless the plaintiff could show that the defamatory statement was made with "actual malice," which the Court defined as making the defamatory statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.
The Noonan case, of course, involved a private plaintiff and defendant.
April 17, 2009
First Circuit pulls the plug on courtroom Webcast
In what may be a technically correct, but philosophically disappointing, decision, the First Circuit has prohibited enforcement of an order by U. S. District Judge Nancy Gertner, which would have allowed a "gavel-to-gavel" Web cast of a hearing in a case against college students for alleged illegal downloading of music.
In In re: Sony BMG Music Entertainment et al. the court concluded that Judge Gertner's order--based on a request by one of the defendants, grad student Joel Tennenbaum, represented by Harvard Law School Professor Charles Nesson, was based on a "palpably incorrect" interpretation of a local court rule.
Nesson is a founder of Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Kermit Lipez stated that "there are no sound
policy reasons to prohibit the webcasting authorized by the district court," and that the issue "calls into question the continued relevance and vitality of a rule that requires such a disagreeable outcome." He went on to note the irony that an audio recording of the oral argument in the hearing before the First Circuit was available on the court's Web site immediately after the argument.
To hear a recording of the hearing and view background material, go to The Recording Industry vs. The People blog.
Another site that contains a link to an audio recording of the hearing, and other information about the case, is Joelfightsback.com, a site apparently run by a group of students--under the guidance of Professor Nesson--assisting in Tennenbaum's defense.
In In re: Sony BMG Music Entertainment et al. the court concluded that Judge Gertner's order--based on a request by one of the defendants, grad student Joel Tennenbaum, represented by Harvard Law School Professor Charles Nesson, was based on a "palpably incorrect" interpretation of a local court rule.
Nesson is a founder of Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Kermit Lipez stated that "there are no sound
policy reasons to prohibit the webcasting authorized by the district court," and that the issue "calls into question the continued relevance and vitality of a rule that requires such a disagreeable outcome." He went on to note the irony that an audio recording of the oral argument in the hearing before the First Circuit was available on the court's Web site immediately after the argument.
To hear a recording of the hearing and view background material, go to The Recording Industry vs. The People blog.
Another site that contains a link to an audio recording of the hearing, and other information about the case, is Joelfightsback.com, a site apparently run by a group of students--under the guidance of Professor Nesson--assisting in Tennenbaum's defense.
April 7, 2009
First Circuit brings home the bacon for Fox media defendants
In Levesque v. Doocy (No. 08-1814) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit last month affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in behalf of the media defendants--Fox News Network and two individual anchors for the Fox & Friends program--in a defamation and false light case brought by a superintendent of schools in Maine.
In short, the case arose from an April 2007 incident at a Maine middle school, where a student placed a bag of ham on a cafeteria table where Somali Muslim students were sitting. A producer for Fox & Friends subsequently picked up an online story (published via Associated Content) about the incident and the reaction by school officials. That story included certain mischaracterizations and humorous references, which made it through the Fox producer's fact-checking process and found their way onto the air.
In affirming the district court decision, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that even as to three statements (including the erroneous attribution to the plaintiff of a comment that "ham is not a toy") that were "materially false, reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, and highly offensive for purposes of the false light claim," the plaintiff (a public official) failed to produce evidence that the defendants had acted with "constitutional malice" when making the statements.
The district court had determined that other statements were protected on multiple grounds, such as being substantially true or constituting protected rhetorical hyperbole.
The opinion by the First Circuit provides a good discussion of the Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard that applies to defamation claims by a public official.
In short, the case arose from an April 2007 incident at a Maine middle school, where a student placed a bag of ham on a cafeteria table where Somali Muslim students were sitting. A producer for Fox & Friends subsequently picked up an online story (published via Associated Content) about the incident and the reaction by school officials. That story included certain mischaracterizations and humorous references, which made it through the Fox producer's fact-checking process and found their way onto the air.
In affirming the district court decision, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that even as to three statements (including the erroneous attribution to the plaintiff of a comment that "ham is not a toy") that were "materially false, reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, and highly offensive for purposes of the false light claim," the plaintiff (a public official) failed to produce evidence that the defendants had acted with "constitutional malice" when making the statements.
The district court had determined that other statements were protected on multiple grounds, such as being substantially true or constituting protected rhetorical hyperbole.
The opinion by the First Circuit provides a good discussion of the Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard that applies to defamation claims by a public official.
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