No chance for LaChance

In a to-the-point rescript opinion in Edward D. LaChance, Jr. v. Boston Herald et al.,the Appeals Court of Massachusetts this week affirmed a summary judgment dismissal of defamation and other claims brought by LaChance, an incarcerated prisoner, against the Boston Herald and one of its reporters.

In 2004, while serving a sentence for aggravated rape, LaChance placed a personal ad on a Web site known as “Inmate Connections” (in violation of prison rules barring maximum security inmates from Internet access). 

In 2005, the Herald published three articles on the topic of online “dating" by incarcerated felons. The articles variously stated—incorrectly—that LaChance had been convicted of manslaughter, that he claimed in his ad to be in prison for manslaughter, and that he had committed a brutal sexual attack on an elderly woman.

The Herald and its reporter concede that those assertions were factually inaccurate, in that LaChance was not in prison for manslaughter, did not make such a claim in his ad, and did not commit a crime against an elderly victim.

The trial court ruled that the alleged defamatory statements were either privileged or substantially true, and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

In affirming the dismissal, the Appeals Court concluded that the newspaper articles at issue addressed matters of public concern—the dangers of interacting with violent felons online—and that as a result of his own actions—whereby LaChance thrust himself into a particular public controversy—LaChance was a limited purpose public figure. In arriving at that conclusion, the court noted that LaChance’s ad was misleading and controversial, finding particularly deceptive his assertion that, “I’m not a bad man and I treat everyone the way I wish to be treated.”

The court then turned to whether the subject statements were false and made with actual malice.

Although the articles contained inaccuracies (even a literal falsehood), the court concluded that such statements did not rise to the level of actionable falsity or defamation. The gist of the articles was accurate: inmate ads should not be trusted in general, and LaChance’s ad in particular was dangerously deceptive in that he withheld details of his violent criminal history and portrayed himself in a light that might seem more innocuous to potential respondents on the match-making site.

As LaChance offered no proof of actual malice—that is, that the statements were published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether they were false—LaChance failed to carry his burden of proving actual malice.

Finally, the court rejected LaChance’s contention that the fair reporting privilege did not apply to his case. The published article contained a fair and accurate report of a court docket entry as it existed at the time of publication. Even though the entry was in error, it was not corrected until months after the publication of the articles, and the paper had no way of knowing about the error at the time of publication. As such, the reference to a brutal sexual attack on an elderly woman was, although inaccurate, privileged and insulated from a claim of defamation.

And to answer your question ("Who would represent this guy in a defamation case?") ... yes, LaChance represented himself. The media defendants were represented by Liz Ritvo.

Staples Nails Verdict

The National Law Journal reports that last week a jury sitting in the Noonan v. Staples case in federal court in Boston found that when Staples sent a mass email about a former employee's violation of company travel and expense policies it did not do so with actual malice.

Earlier this year the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a dismissal of the case against Staples, holding that the plaintiff could seek to establish a libel claim based on the publication of truthful facts if they were published with "actual malevolent intent or ill will." In so doing, the Court relied on an old Massachusetts law, G. L. c. 231, sec. 92, which provides that truth is a justification for a publication alleged to be libellous, unless it was published with actual malice.

The jury in the Staples case evidently found that there was no such "actual malice" on the part of Staples.

It is important to note that the use of the term "actual malice" in the 1902 Massachusetts statute long-predates, and should not be confused with, the the term "actual malice" used by the Supreme Court of the United States in the seminal 1963 case of New York Times v. Sullivan. In that case, the Court laid out constitutional standards to protect the press from defamation claims brought by public officials. holding that a public official could not recover for libel unless the plaintiff could show that the defamatory statement was made with "actual malice," which the Court defined as making the defamatory statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.


The Noonan case, of course, involved a private plaintiff and defendant.

You're Dismissed!

A new Jersey state superior court judge Wednesday dismissed the defamation case brought by Donald Trump against an author, Timothy L. O'Brien, who had stated in his book Trump Nation: The Art of Being the Donald that Trump was worth (only) $150 to $250 million. Trump asserted that at the time the book was published he was actually worth $4 or 5 billion.

The court concluded that Trump had failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the author had acted with actual malice.

Trump, who sought $5 billion in damages, indicated he will appeal.

First Circuit brings home the bacon for Fox media defendants

In Levesque v. Doocy (No. 08-1814) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit last month affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in behalf of the media defendants--Fox News Network and two individual anchors for the Fox & Friends program--in a defamation and false light case brought by a superintendent of schools in Maine.

In short, the case arose from an April 2007 incident at a Maine middle school, where a student placed a bag of ham on a cafeteria table where Somali Muslim students were sitting. A producer for Fox & Friends subsequently picked up an online story (published via Associated Content) about the incident and the reaction by school officials. That story included certain mischaracterizations and humorous references, which made it through the Fox producer's fact-checking process and found their way onto the air.

In affirming the district court decision, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that even as to three statements (including the erroneous attribution to the plaintiff of a comment that "ham is not a toy") that were "materially false, reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, and highly offensive for purposes of the false light claim," the plaintiff (a public official) failed to produce evidence that the defendants had acted with "constitutional malice" when making the statements.

The district court had determined that other statements were protected on multiple grounds, such as being substantially true or constituting protected rhetorical hyperbole.

The opinion by the First Circuit provides a good discussion of the Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard that applies to defamation claims by a public official.