No chance for LaChance

In a to-the-point rescript opinion in Edward D. LaChance, Jr. v. Boston Herald et al.,the Appeals Court of Massachusetts this week affirmed a summary judgment dismissal of defamation and other claims brought by LaChance, an incarcerated prisoner, against the Boston Herald and one of its reporters.

In 2004, while serving a sentence for aggravated rape, LaChance placed a personal ad on a Web site known as “Inmate Connections” (in violation of prison rules barring maximum security inmates from Internet access). 

In 2005, the Herald published three articles on the topic of online “dating" by incarcerated felons. The articles variously stated—incorrectly—that LaChance had been convicted of manslaughter, that he claimed in his ad to be in prison for manslaughter, and that he had committed a brutal sexual attack on an elderly woman.

The Herald and its reporter concede that those assertions were factually inaccurate, in that LaChance was not in prison for manslaughter, did not make such a claim in his ad, and did not commit a crime against an elderly victim.

The trial court ruled that the alleged defamatory statements were either privileged or substantially true, and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

In affirming the dismissal, the Appeals Court concluded that the newspaper articles at issue addressed matters of public concern—the dangers of interacting with violent felons online—and that as a result of his own actions—whereby LaChance thrust himself into a particular public controversy—LaChance was a limited purpose public figure. In arriving at that conclusion, the court noted that LaChance’s ad was misleading and controversial, finding particularly deceptive his assertion that, “I’m not a bad man and I treat everyone the way I wish to be treated.”

The court then turned to whether the subject statements were false and made with actual malice.

Although the articles contained inaccuracies (even a literal falsehood), the court concluded that such statements did not rise to the level of actionable falsity or defamation. The gist of the articles was accurate: inmate ads should not be trusted in general, and LaChance’s ad in particular was dangerously deceptive in that he withheld details of his violent criminal history and portrayed himself in a light that might seem more innocuous to potential respondents on the match-making site.

As LaChance offered no proof of actual malice—that is, that the statements were published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether they were false—LaChance failed to carry his burden of proving actual malice.

Finally, the court rejected LaChance’s contention that the fair reporting privilege did not apply to his case. The published article contained a fair and accurate report of a court docket entry as it existed at the time of publication. Even though the entry was in error, it was not corrected until months after the publication of the articles, and the paper had no way of knowing about the error at the time of publication. As such, the reference to a brutal sexual attack on an elderly woman was, although inaccurate, privileged and insulated from a claim of defamation.

And to answer your question ("Who would represent this guy in a defamation case?") ... yes, LaChance represented himself. The media defendants were represented by Liz Ritvo.

Truth with consequences?

In Noonan v. Staples, the U. S. First Circuit Court of Appeals today denied Staples' request for rehearing en banc. The court also stated that there is no need to certify the question at issue to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Last month the court issued a controversial opinion in which the court held that, based upon an anachronistic Massachusetts statute, G. L. c. 231, sec. 92, a private figure plaintiff may recover for defamation based on truthful statements--yes, you read that correctly, truthful statements--made with "actual malevolent intent or ill will," as long as the subject statements relate to matters of purely private concern.

The case will now return to the trial court. Stay tuned.

"Public criticism of public officials"

That is how renowned media lawyer Bruce Sanford, from the Washington, D.C., office of Baker Hostetler, appearing on behalf of the Boston Herald before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court this morning, characterized the subject matter of the reporting at issue in the Herald's appeal of the 2005 $2 milllion libel award to Superior Court Judge Ernest Murphy.

And that is exactly right.

While the judicial climate in the SJC courtroom was not as frigid as the weather outside, my impression is that the Herald's arguments were met with something cooler than a warm welcome.

Justice Cowin, in particular, focused repeatedly on the words "tell her," which she said changed the gist of the reported statements. Sanford, however, viewed those words as immaterial and insignificant, and commented that applicable law does not require reporters and sources to agree precisely. He also noted that none of the reporter's [district attorney] sources ever contacted the paper to say that he was misquoted.

While acknowledging that the reporter may have made one or two technical mistakes in his stories, Sanford emphasized that such mistakes do not equal substantial falsity.

Sanford also cautioned that under the standards of Times v. Sullivan, appellate judges are not charged with being "superannuated editors."

Arguing for Murphy, Suffolk Law School professor Michael Avery referred to what he called the reporter's knowing fabrications, and essentially argued that whatever the standard of review, there is overwhelming evidence to support the jury's decisions in favor of Murphy.

In posing questions to Avery, Chief Justice Margaret Marshall noted that her own research showed that on appeal few libel awards in favor of public officials, and judges in particular, are upheld on appeal.

Let's hope that is a harbinger of the Court's decision in this case.